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Abstract: Web services send and receive messages in XML syntax with some parts hashed,
encrypted or signed, according to the WS-Security standard. In this paper we introduce a
model to formally describe the protocols that underly these services, their security properties
and the rewriting attacks they might be subject to. Unlike with usual security protocols,
we have to address here the facts that: (1) The Web service receive/send actions are non-
deterministic to accommodate the XML format and the lack of normalization in parsing
XML messages. Our model is designed to permit non-deterministic operations. (2) The
Web service message format is better modelled with multiset constructors than with fixed
arity symbols. Hence we had to introduce an attacker model that handles associative-
commutative operators. In particular we present a decision procedure for insecurity of Web
services with messages built using encryption, signature, and other cryptographic primitives.
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Résumé :
Les services Web envoient et reçoivent des messages en format XML en utilisant les
protocoles SOAP. Les recommandations de sécurité du consortium W3C autorisent des
parties du message à être signées, cryptées,. . . Dans ce rapport nous décrivons un modèle
pour décrire formellement les protocoles implémentés par ces services leurs propriétés de
sécurité ainsi que les attaques base de réécriture dont ils font l’objet. Contrairement aux
protocoles cryptographiques usuels, nous devons prendre en compte deux particularités:
(1) les actions de réception/envoi des services Web sont non-déterministes afin de refléter
le format XML et le manque de normalisation pour l’analyse de des messages SOAP.
Notre modèle est suffisamment souple pour traiter le non-déterminisme et permet de décrire
précisement les actions que réalise chaque participant.
(2) Le format des message est mieux modélisé comme un multi-ensemble de termes plutôt
que comme un terme d’arité fixe. Par conséquent nous devons définir un modèle d’attaquant
plus puissant que ceux qui existent actuellement: en particulier nous donnons une procédure
de décision pour les protocoles non-déterministes utilisant les multi-ensembles, qui peut être
combinée avec la plupart des opérateurs algébriques pour lesquels on connait une procédure
de décision pour la propriété de secret (xor, etc...).
Mots-clés : Protocoles cryptographiques, combinaison de procédures de décision, théories
équationnelles
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1 Introduction
Web services promise to be a standard technology for Internet and enterprise networks.
They require the ability to transmit securely messages in XML syntax using SOAP protocol.
Messages that travel over the networks can be observed and modified by intruders. Hence
the protocol was extended by W3C for allowing to sign and encrypt some parts of the
contents. Nevertheless, as for classical protocols, cryptographic mechanisms are not sufficient
for securing Web services. Not only they might be subject to the same attacks (e.g. man-in-
the middle) as classical cryptographic protocols, but the XML syntax and the specific way
messages are processed (e.g. not examining the full content) gives the opportunity to mount
new class of attacks, such as XML rewriting attacks as shown in [4].
Recently many decision procedures have been proposed for analysing cryptographic pro-
tocols. These procedures rely on automated deduction and constraint solving procedures
extending semantic unification. Our objective in this work is to investigate whether these
results can be lifted to Web services. First it appears immediately that the flexible XML
format requires to consider message contents as sets of terms rather than terms: this intro-
duces a first difficulty since no security decidability results exist yet for protocols using such
a data structure. Second, since messages are only partially parsed by SOAP, the answer to
a request might be multiple depending on the implementation: in other words we have to
model a non-deterministic behaviour of the Web service protocols.
A role-based protocol model has been proposed in previous works [5]. This model admits
two versions. In the first one, the equational model, operations (including decryption) are
explicit and the basic operations are deterministic. We believe that this constraint is inherent
to the model, as non-determinism in equational theories leads to incoherence. The second
model, the pattern-matching model, relies on patterns to filter incoming messages. It has
been widely studied but proofs in this model are often complex and obscure, and there is
no general combination result that would permit one to extend existing decision procedures
to a new operation (the multiset operator, in our case).
Motivated by these facts, and also for the sake of deriving a uniform framework, we
propose a protocol model that is more general than the two commonly used ones. It al-
lows to manipulate XML messages as multisets of terms and can simulate non-deterministic
answers. Moreover decidability and combination results (previous known only for the equa-
tional model [9]) have been lifted to this more general model. The proofs are involved and
do not follow from the ones in simpler models.
Related works. The most advanced project in the area of Web services and formal veri-
fication is Samoa Project [4]. This project offers a language to express SOAP-based security
protocols and a compiler from this language to the applied pi calculus on which ProVerif
resolution-based system can be run to verify secrecy and authentication properties. Our
approach can be viewed as a complementary one since it provides decision procedures that
are complete for finitely many sessions, even with an associative-commutative XML message
constructor (and also other operators such as Dolev Yao encryption/decryption). On the
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protocol side, a lot of work has been dedicated to security analysis modulo algebraic proper-
ties (see e.g. [3, 11, 14]). However no decidability results have been reported for associative
or associative-commutative operators, supporting the combination with other useful cryp-
tographic primitives (such as XOR). To our knowledge, the ones we report here are the first
of this kind, and we show how they apply to deciding security properties of XML services.
These results rely on intensive use of term rewriting and unification techniques [18, 2].
Paper organization. First, we describe an example of XML-rewriting attacks in Sec-
tion 2, then we recall the notions of term rewriting we use on our model in Section 3.
Section 4 formally defines the deductions that can be performed by intruders and honest
agents in a protocol. We introduce symbolic derivations as parameterized deductions. They
can be viewed as a variant of strand spaces, a fundamental concept in protocol analysis [20].
Then we show how to combine deductions associated to different operators in Section 9.
Finally we apply in Section 10 the combination scheme to a multi-set of terms constructor,
and show how it provides us with a decidable analysis of XML protocols.
2 An example of Web Service and XML rewriting at-
tack
Web services can be described as a set of receive/send action between clients and the
provider, where the messages are XML terms following the SOAP format. Messages are
constructed and parsed according to the security policy of the service which usually requires
that some parts of the message are encrypted, signed using known algorithms like sha1,
rsa,. . . , may contain timestamps, make reference to trusted third party,. . . . A SOAP mes-
sage is an envelope consisting of a mandatory body and of an optional header. The header
contains the useful informations about the message and usually has a security part that
follows the WS-security specification defined by the OASIS organization. For instance Alice
may send the following message to Bob, her correspondent in the travel agency:
INRIA
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<Envelope>
<Header>
<To> http://www.travel-for-free.com/~bob </>
<Security>
<timestamp>2007-04-16T09:56:43Z</>
<signature>
<signedInfo>
<reference URI=#1>a string</>
<signatureValue>another string </>
</></></></>
<Body>
<Order id=1>
<beneficiary>Alice</>
<account>Alice</>
<trip>Bremen</>
</></></>
that orders a ticket for Bremen, for herself, and to be charged to her account. In the
security header, the first string is a digest of the body, and the other string is the encryption
of this digest using the private key of Alice. For efficiency purpose, only parts of the
messages are encrypted or signed and we model the fact that a node labelled by some
tag has an arbitrary number of elements by introducing a unary symbol a( ) for each tag
’a’ and an associative-commutative multiset constructor. For instance, the body of the
above XML message corresponds to the term Body(Order(beneficiary(Alice) ·account(Alice) ·
trip(Bremen))) where e1 · . . . · en denotes the multiset {e1, . . . , en}. Another possibility is to
replace the multiset operator by an associative operator for sequences. In Web services, the
component of messages are selected by their tag and security policies usually refer to this
name and don’t consider the possibility of multiple occurrences of the same tag.
In our example, the recipient Bob, performs several security checks, including the verifi-
cation of the signature, then looks for a part of the Body labelled Order, orders a ticket for
the requested trip and charges Alice’s account. Then, he sends to Alice a SOAP message
with a security header containing the digest of the original message and a body containing
an access code for the trip encoded by the public key of the beneficiary (that Alice will
transfer to the beneficiary). Like in the study of cryptographic protocols, we assume that
cryptography is perfect, but we don’t make any particular hypothesis on the implementation
of parsing XML trees. An attacker Charlie may intercept the message and forge a new one
that inserts a new Order item to the Body:
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<Order id=2>
<beneficiary>Charlie </>
<account>Alice</>
<trip> Hawaii</>
</>
just before the previous Order. An implementation of the service may lead to a successful
verification of the signature and to sending the accesscode to Charlie depending on how the
XML term is parsed. If the first match of Order is chosen, then Charlie gets the accesscode,
since the signature is correct because the reference to the initial Order is still used. But
another implementation could parse the children of a node from right to left and select the
correct Order subterm. Therefore the behavior of the protocol is non-deterministic which
we model by rules that select a element Order( ) in a multiset. To describe the behaviour
of the service, we model all the operations that the participants can do and all algebraic
relations that may hold between the operators, which is done by the means of deduction
rules and equations. A possible abstraction of the security protocol P that supports the
service is:
A→B : se(h(order(x, y, z)), SKA) · order(x, y, z)
B→A : se(h(order(x, y, z)), PKA) · se(accesscode(z), PKx)
where h denotes a hashing function, order(x, y, z) denotes the request for trip z for ben-
eficiary x, with y the account to charge, h is a hash function, accesscode(z) is the code
requested to get the ticket from automata, se(x, y) denotes the encryption of x using key y,
PKx is the public key of x, SKx is the private key of x. The intruder deductive power is
given by the classical Dolev-Yao rules (see [13, 21]) extended by a rule that allows to select
any element in a multiset. For some realistic implementations of the service as the one that
is described in Section 4 the following attack will be possible:
A→IB : se(h(order(A,A,Bremen)), SKA)·order(A, A,Bremen)
IA→B : se(h(order(A,A,Bremen)), SKA)·order(C, A,Hawaii)·order(A, A,Bremen)
B→IA : se(h(order(A,A,Bremen)), PKA)·se(accesscode(Hawaii), PKC)
where IA (resp. IB) denotes a malicious agent I masquerading the honest participant A
(resp. B), and the secret key SKC is known by I (C = I or C has been compromised).
3 Terms, subterms and ordered rewriting
3.1 Basic notions
We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variables X . For all
signatures F (i.e. a set of function symbols with arities), we denote by T(F) (resp. T(F ,X ))
the set of terms over F ∪C (resp. F ∪C∪X ). The former is called the set of ground terms
over F , while the later is simply called the set of terms over F . Variables are denoted
by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of terms are written E, F, ..., and
decorations thereof, respectively. For finite sets of terms, we abbreviate E ∪ F by E, F , the
union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E \ {t} by E \ t.
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Given a signature F a constant is either a free constant in C or a function symbol of
arity 0 in F . Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of variables occurring in t and by
Cons(t) the set of constants occurring in t. An atom is either a variable or a constant and
we denote by Atoms(t) the set Var(t) ∪ Cons(t).
A substitution σ is an involutive mapping from X to T(F ,X ) such that Supp(σ) =
{x |σ(x) 6= x}, the support of σ, is a finite set. The application of a substitution σ to a term
t (resp. a set of terms E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp. the
terms in E) where all variables x have been replaced by the term xσ. A substitution σ is
ground w.r.t. a signature F and a set of variables V if the image of Supp(σ) is included in
T(F) and V ⊆ Supp(σ). We simply say that a substitution σ is ground if F and V are clear
from the context.
An equational presentation H = (F , A) is defined by a set A of equations r = t with r, t ∈
T(F ,X ). For any equational presentation H the relation =H denotes the equational theory
generated by (F , A) on T(F ,X ), that is the smallest congruence containing all instances of
axioms of A. We shall not distinguish between an equational presentationH over a signature
F and a set A of equations presenting it and denote both H. We will also often refer to
H as an equational theory (meaning the equational theory presented by H). An equational
theory H is consistent if there exists at least one model of H with more than one element.
Equivalently a theory H is consistent if there does not exist two free constants x and y such
that x 6= y and x =H y.
The syntactic subterms of a term t are denoted Subsyn(t) and are defined recursively as
follows. If t is an atom then Subsyn(t) = {t} otherwise, let t = f(t1, . . . , tn) and Subsyn(t) =
{t}∪
⋃n
i=1 Subsyn(ti). The positions in a term t are sequences of integers defined recursively
as follows, ε being the empty sequence. The term t is at position ε in t. If u is a syntactic
subterm of t at position p and if u = f(u1, . . . , un) then ui is at position p · i in t for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The replacement of the subterm of t at position p is denoted by t[p← s], for
a set of positions Π, t[Π← s] denotes the replacement of all subterms at position p ∈ Π by
s.
3.2 Congruences and ordered rewriting
Ordered rewriting [12] is a useful tool that has been used (e.g. [2]) to prove the correctness
of combination of unification algorithms.
Let < be a simplification ordering on T(F) 1 assumed to be total on T(F) and such that
(i) the minimal element for < is a constant cmin ∈ C; (ii) each non-free constant is smaller
than any non-constant ground term.
We denote by Cspe the set containing the constants in F and cmin.
Given a possibly infinite set of equations O on the signature T(F), the ordered rewriting
relation→O is defined by t→O t
′ iff there exists a position p in t, an equation l = r in O and
a substitution τ such that t = t[p← lτ ], t′ = t[p← rτ ], and lτ > rτ . Since < is monotonic,
note that this last condition implies t′ < t. It has been shown (see [12]) that applying
1by definition < satisfies for all s, t, u ∈ T(F) s < t[s] and s < u implies t[s] < t[u]
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the unfailing completion procedure to a set of equations H yields a (possibly infinite) set of
equations O such that: (i) the congruence relations =O and =H are equal on T(F). (ii) the
ordered rewrite relation →O is convergent (i.e. terminating and confluent) on T(F).
We shall say that O is an o-completion of H. Since the rewrite system→O is convergent
on ground terms, we can define (t)↓O as the unique normal form of the ground term t for
→O. A ground term t is in normal form, or normalised, if t = (t)↓O. Given a ground
substitution σ we denote by (σ)↓O the substitution with the same support such that for all
variables x ∈ Supp(σ) we have x(σ)↓O = (xσ)↓O . A substitution σ is normal if σ = (σ)↓O .
The proofs of the next sequence of lemmas can be found in [10] and thus is omitted here.
Lemma 1 Assume that g = d ∈ R, z ∈ Var(d) \ Var(g), and s →R s′ with s = s[p ← gτ ],
s′ = s[p ← dτ ], gτ > dτ . Let us define the substitution σ such that for all variables x 6= z
we have xσ = xτ and zσ = cmin. Then we have also: s→R s[p← dσ]
Lemma 2 If H is a consistent equational theory then for any equation g = d in a presen-
tation of H with g 6= d if there exists a substitution τ such that gτ > dτ then g is not a
variable.
3.3 Unification problems
We define when a substitution σ satisfies a set of equations S.
Definition 1 (Unification systems) Let H be a set of equational axioms on T(F ,X ). An
H-Unification system S is a finite set of couples of terms in T(F ,X ) denoted by (ui
?
=
vi)i∈{1,...,n}. The ground substitution σ satisfies S, denoted by σ |= S, iff for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n} uiσ =H viσ.
4 Modelling service execution
4.1 A model for secure Web Services
Let us first briefly review the situation we want to model. Some simple Web services are
akin to functions in a library. Their execution is triggered by the reception of a request
from a client, to which they immediately respond. These services are advertised by a WSDL
specification that defines among other things the contents of the input and output messages.
It is also possible to specify some cryptographic protection for integrity, confidentiality and
authenticity of a request by means of a published security policy. This policy will constrain
acceptable requests by mandating that some parts have to be signed, encrypted or integrity
protected. These parts are expressed either by identifiers or by XPath expressions, and
we say that these services are protected. Finally, some WS standards, e.g. BPEL, WS-
SecureConversation, and others, permit to express sequences of simple service invocations,
which we call workflows. We call totally ordered sequences workflow executions, as they also
correspond to traces of service workflows.
INRIA
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The analysis of Web services is thus very similar to the one of cryptographic protocols.
A protected service workflow is a composition of roles (client, service,. . . ), and a workflow
execution is akin to a protocol execution. Agents impersonate the roles in a workflow
execution.
This similarity shall not, however, hide the differences at the level of messages. In the
case of cryptographic protocols, the patterns of admissible messages are fixed, and known
by the intruder, whereas security policies just express constraints on the presence of some
particular subterms at some position in a message. Moreover, and since services are in most
cases automatically generated, the verification of a message is likely to be independent of
the construction of a response. Finally, some implementation may return only one node in
a hedge when several ones correspond to an XPath expression, thereby allowing for XML
injection attacks. The work described in this paper focuses on security policies expressing
paths of subterms from the root (envelope) of the message, leaving general XPath constraints
to future work.
Example 1 A client A invokes a service B by sending se(h(order(x, y, z)), SKA)·order(x, y, z),
where x, y and z are instantiated parameters of the client. Then it receives a response r
which is parsed to check that it contains the nodes se(z, PKA) and se(u, v) at its root, with
v = PKx and z = h(order(x, y, z)).
The intruder and the insecurity problem. In the Dolev-Yao model [13], attacks on
protocols are modelled by the addition of a malicious participant, called the intruder that
controls the network. It can intercept, block and/or redirect all messages sent by honest
agents. It can also masquerade its identity and take part in the protocol under the identity of
an honest participant. Its control of the communication network is modelled by considering
that all messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to the intruder and that all messages
received by the honest agents are always sent by the intruder. Besides the control on the
net, the intruder has specific rules to deduce new values and compute messages. From the
intruder’s point of view a finite execution of a protocol is therefore the interleaving of a finite
sequence of messages it has to send and a finite sequence of messages it receives (and add to
its knowledge). Therefore the intruder is simply an additional role that runs concurrently
with the honest participants.
The protocol is insecure if some secret knowledge is revealed during the execution of the
protocol, which is modelled by adding to the protocol a last step that reveals the secret.
The insecurity problem amounts to finding a sequence of actions of the intruder such that
its composition with the (extended) protocol is executable.
4.2 Deduction systems
We give a formal model for roles and the execution of roles (including the intruder).
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4.2.1 Deduction rules
We model messages as ground terms and deductions as rewrite rules on sets of messages
representing the knowledge of an agent. Each role derives new messages from a given (finite)
set of messages by applying deduction rules. Furthermore, these derivations are considered
modulo the equational congruence =H generated by the equational axioms satisfied by the
function symbols of the signature F .
Definition 2 An deduction rule is a rule d : t1, . . . , tn → t with terms t1, . . . , tn, t such that
for every ground substitution σ:
Const((tσ)↓) ⊆ ∪ni=1Const((tiσ)↓) ∪ Cspe
This condition is very similar to the well-definedness condition of [19, 15]. When the
equational theories are regular (a.k.a. non-erasing or variable-preserving), this condition
holds iff Var(t) ⊆ Var(t1, . . . , tn).
Example 2 x, y → 〈x, y〉 is a deduction rule since the symbol function 〈 , 〉 is free. This
rules allows an agent (who can be the intruder) to construct a new pair from two values
already known.
4.2.2 Deduction systems and derivations
Deduction rules are the basic ingredients for deduction systems.
Definition 3 A deduction system D is a triple 〈F ,R,H〉 where F is a signature, R is a set
of deduction rules and H is a set of equations between terms in T(F ,X ). For each deduction
rule d : t1, . . . , tn → t ∈ R, the set GI(d) denotes the set of ground instances of the rule d
modulo H:
GI(d) = {l→ r | ∃σ, ground substitution on F , l =H t1σ, . . . , tnσ and r =H tσ}
The set of rules GID is defined as the union of the sets GI(d) for all d ∈ R.
Example 3 Let F = {〈 , 〉 , se( , ), ·, cmin, a, b, . . . , na, nb, . . . , Ka, Kb, . . .}, RI = {x, y →
〈x, y〉 ; x, y → se(x, y); se(x, y), y → x; 〈x, y〉 → x; 〈x, y〉 → y; x, y → x · y, a(x1, . . . , xn) · y →
a(x1, . . . , xn)}, H = {x · y = y · x, x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z}, where a( ) stands for any n-ary
symbol of F different from ·. Then the deduction system D = 〈F ,RI ,H〉 describes the
classical Dolev-Yao model with the addition of an associative-commutative operation · and
of the rules that allow to build multisets with · or to extract parts of a multiset.
Each deduction rule l → r in GID defines an deduction relation →l→r between finite
sets of terms: given two finite sets of terms E and F we define E →l→r F if and only if
l ⊆ E and F = E, r. We denote →D the union of the relations→l→r for all l → r such that
l→ r ∈ GI(d) for some d ∈ R, and by →∗D the transitive closure of →D. We simply denote
by → the relation →D when there is no ambiguity about the deduction system D.
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Definition 4 A derivation D of length n ≥ 0, is a sequence E0 →D E1 →D · · · →D
En where E0, . . . En are finite set of ground terms such that Ei = Ei−1, ti for every i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. The term tn is called the goal of the derivation.
Example 4 The previous deduction system has a derivation:
{Ka, 〈se(s, Ka), a〉 , a, b} →D {Ka, 〈se(s, Ka), a〉 , se(s, Ka), a, b}
→D {Ka, 〈se(s, Ka), a〉 , se(s, Ka), s, a, b}
that describes the discovering of a secret s by an intruder that knows the encryption key
Ka, identity of agents and intercepts a message 〈se(s, Ka), a〉. The ground deduction rules
employed are 〈se(s, Ka), a〉 → se(s, Ka) and se(s, Ka), Ka → s
The set of terms that can be derived from E is DerD(E) = {t | ∃F s.t. E →∗D F and t ∈ F}.
If there is no ambiguity on the deduction system D we write Der(E) instead of DerD(E).
A derivation is without stutter if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti ∈ Ej implies i ≥ j.
The set of equations H yields an ordered rewriting relation that is used to normalize
terms. Let O be an o-completion of H. The next result will allow us to restrict ourselves to
deductions and derivations with normalized terms:
Lemma 3 Let E be a set of ground terms and let t be a ground term. Then there is a
deduction E → F iff there is a deduction (E)↓O → (F )↓O.
From now on, we assume that all the deduction rules generate terms that are normalized
by →O and that the goal and the initial set are in normal form for →O.
4.3 Symbolic derivation
Given a deduction system 〈F ,R, E〉, a role applies rules in R to construct the response of
step i. Moreover a role may test equalities to check the well-formedness of a message. Hence
the activity of a role can be expressed by a fixed symbolic derivation:
Definition 5 (Symbolic Derivation) A symbolic derivation for deduction system 〈F ,R, E〉
is a tuple (V ,S,K, In,Out) where V is a sequence of variables, (xi)i∈Ind, indexed by a
linearly ordered set (Ind, <), K is a set of ground term (the initial knowledge) In, Out
are disjoint subsets of Ind and S is a set of equations such that for all xi ∈ V one of the
following holds:
• i ∈ In
• There exists a ground term t ∈ K and an equation xi
?
= t in S;
• There exists a rule l1, . . . , lm → r ∈ R such that S contains the equations xi
?
= r and
xαj
?
= lj for j ∈ {1, . . . , m} with αj < i.
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A symbolic derivation is closed if In = Out = ∅, and may be simply denoted by (V ,S,K).
A substitution σ satisfies a closed symbolic derivation if σ |=E S.
To improve readability in the examples, we will replace every index i in a set of indexes
I by the variable xi that is associated to it. In the same way we will write
Example 5 The role A of P played by agent a can be described by the symbolic deduction
system 〈F ,RB ,H〉 with Fand Has before and
RA = {cmin → se(h(order(x, y, z)), SKA) · order(x, y, z)
se(h(order(x, y, z)), PKA) · se(accesscode(z), SKx)→ ok}
and a symbolic derivation for this role is:
V = {xA1 , y
A
1 , x
A
2 , y
A
2 }, In = {x
A
1 , x
A
2 }, Out = {y
A
1 , y
A
2 }
K = {a, b, Ka, Kb, pub(Ka), pub(Kb), OK}
S = { xA1 = cmin, y
A
1 = se(h(order(x, y, z)), SKa) · order(x, y, z),
xA2 = se(h(order(x, y, z)), PKa) · se(accesscode(z), SKx), y
A
2 = ok}
The role B of P played by agent b can be described by the symbolic deduction 〈F ,RB ,H〉
with Fand Has before and
RB = {se(h(order(x, y, z)), SKb)·order(x, y, z)→ se(h(order(x, y, z)), PKa)·se(accesscode(z), SKx)}
and a symbolic derivation for this role is:
V = {xB1 , y
B
1 }, In = {x
B
1 }, Out = {y
B
1 },
K = {a, b, Ka, Kb, pub(Ka), pub(Kb), OK},
S = {xB1 = se(h(order(x, y)), Kb) · order(x, y), y
B
1 = se(h(order(x, y)), Ka) · OK, }
For simplicity, we have modeled the behaviour of the roles in an abstract way that hides
the actual computation that are performed. In our framework, we can also give a much more
detailed description of the protocol, that describes all this computations: we add to each role
the deduction rules for constructing pairs, encryption, decryption,... Once this is achieved
we can describe the construction of the first message sent by A by describing the construction
of each part. For instance, the subterm se(h(order(x, y, z)), SKa) is built using an instance
of the rule x, y → se(x, y).
In order to compose two symbolic derivations we will connect bijectively (or identify)
some input variables of one derivation with some output variables of the other and vice-
versa. This connection should be compatible with the variable orderings inherited from
each component, in a way that is detailed in the following definition:
Definition 6 (Composition of Symbolic Derivations) Let SD1 = (V1,S1,K1, In1,Out1)
and SD2 = (V2,S2,K2, In2,Out2) be two symbolic derivations, with disjoint sets of vari-
ables and index sets (Ind1, <1) and (Ind2, <2) respectively. Let I1, I2, O1, O2 be subsets of
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In1, In2,Out1,Out2 respectively. and assume that there is an order-preserving bijection φ
from I1∪I2 to O1∪O2 such that φ(I1) = O2 and φ(I2) = O1. A composition of two symbolic
derivations along the sets I1, O1, I2, O2 is a symbolic derivation
(V , φ(S1 ∪ S2),K1 ∪ K2, (In1 ∪ In2) \ (I1 ∪ I2), (Out1 ∪Out2) \ (O1 ∪ O2))
where φ has been extended to a substitution on terms, by taking φ(xi) = xj when φ(i) = j
where V is a sequence of variables indexed by Ind = (Ind1 \ I1) ∪ (Ind2 \ I2), ordered by a
linear extension of the transitive closure of the relation:
<1 ∪ <2 ∪ {(u, v) | v = φ(w) and u <1 w or u <2 w}
and such that the variable of index i in Vis equal to the variable of index i in V1 if i ∈ Ind1,
and to the variable of index i in V2 if i ∈ Ind2.
It can be checked that the composition of two symbolic derivations is indeed a symbolic
derivation. The composition of more than two symbolic derivations can be defined in the
same way.
Example 6 Let us consider the symbolic derivation of the previous example, and let us
assume that the variables are ordered as yA1 , x
A
1 , y
B
1 , y
B
2 , x
A
2 , y
A
2 .
The normal execution of the protocol P corresponds to the composition of the two sym-
bolic derivations of the previous example along I1 = {xA2 }, O1 = {y
A
1 }, I2 = {x
B
1 }, O2 = {y
B
1 }
where the following new equations are added:
yA1 = x
B
1 the first message emitted by A is the first message received by B
yB1 = x
A
2 the first message emitted by B is the second message received by A
4.4 The formal statement of protocol insecurity
Informally we call protocol insecurity problem the question whether the intruder can build a
symbolic derivation that can be composed with the protocol so that the secret gets revealed
to the intruder. We can always extend the protocol (and the associated symbolic derivation)
by a dummy step where the secret is received in clear by a honest agent that already knows
it (hence it has been sent in clear, hence the intruder was able to derive it). This extended
protocol can be completely executed iff the initial protocol was insecure. This shows that we
can reduce the insecurity probleme to the problem whether the composition of a symbolic
derivation and a symbolic intruder derivation admits a solution.
We now give a formal definition of the insecurity problem we consider:
Insecurity Problem
Input: a symbolic derivation Ch for 〈F ,R, E〉 (protocol), a set of terms Ki (in-
truder knowledge)
Output: Sat iff there exists a symbolic derivation Ci = (Vi,Si,Ki, Ini,Outi) for
〈F ,R, E〉, a closed composition Ca of Ci and Ch, and a substitution σ such
that σ satisfies Ca.
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In the rest on the paper we shall consider an equational theory which the union of
disjoints theories. For technical reasons, this leads us to consider a slightly more general
problem:
Ordered Satisfiability
Input: a symbolic derivation Ch for 〈F ,R, E〉 (protocol), a set of terms Ki (in-
truder knowledge), X the set of all variables and C the set of all free
constants occurring in Ch and a linear ordering ≺ on X ∪ C.
Output: Sat iff there exists a symbolic derivation Ci = (Vi,Si,Ki, Ini,Outi) for
〈F ,R, E〉, a closed composition Ca of Ci and Ch, and a substitution σ such
that σ satisfies Ca and: ∀c ∈ C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ Subsyn(xσ)
4.5 Comparison with pattern-matching and equational models
The model that we propose for wokflow analysis shares strong similarities with two models
already proposed for cryptographic protocols: the pattern-matching model and the equational
model. We discuss the relationship between these models and our proposition. In each
model, protocols are a sequence of receive/send actions and use cryptographic primitives
and pairing functions. They differ in the way messages are analyzed and the properties of
cryptographic primitives and algebraic properties of operations are used.
The pattern-matching model. Here the pattern-matching is used to retrieve the parts
of the messages received. For instance, assume that a role A must execute the send/receive
sequence se(x, y) → se(x, Kpub(B)). Let se(NB , K) be the actual message received by A.
Then the pattern-matching algorithm computes the x = NB component independently of
the fact that A knows the key K or not (possibly K is a key that A will learn later on).
This model can be seen as a significative improvement on the original Dolev-Yao model [13]
since it permits to get rid of the equational properties of explicit destructors, leading to the
so-called pattern-matching model.
This model has been extended to handle algebraic properties of operation like ⊕ or
modular exponentiation but this may leads to unrealistic protocols: design a role that
receives a message x ⊕ y and send back x. Setting x = y, the role is set to receive 0 and
to send back any message x. Syntactic ad-hoc conditions has been designed to avoid such
situation (see [8] for the exclusive-or), but the first generic condition is the notion of well-
defined protocol defined in [19]. Although this approach is sound, it doesn’t really address
why these protocols are not plausible. In the ⊕ example, there is simply no way for the role
to extract a value x from x⊕ y using the usual operations that a role performs. Our models
describes this property by forbidding deduction rules like x ⊕ y → x (this rule doesn’t
satisfy the definition requirements). But, we shall not use a rule recv(gy).send(y) as a
deduction rule: it is well-defined but it corresponds to the resolution of a modular logarithm
problem, which is not a plausible operation for a role. Our model is more precise than the
pattern matching model. Conversely, an induction on derivation shows that any symbolic
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derivation is an execution of a well-defined protocol execution in the pattern matching
model. This shows that we can lift the decidability results already stated in that case to
our model. The combination result that we prove in Section 9 provides a the combined
analysis of independent operators, which greatly simplifies the proofs and allows a modular
implementation of dedicated protocol analysis methods. No such modular appraoch exists
for well-defined protocols. Futhermore, we are not aware of any general decision procedure
for the well-definedness of protocols, when a simple syntactic analysis of each rule in set of
derivation rule is enough in our framework. We also strongly conjecture that the decidability
of ground reachability problems suffices to decide whether an object is a symbolic derivation
in the case of an infinite number of deduction rules.
The equational model. The original Dolev and Yao model [13] used explicit construc-
tors (e.g. for encryption se(, ),...) and destructors (e.g. for decryption sd(, )), whith the
equational theories describing the properties of these operations. A role uses explicit de-
structors to extract the relevant parts of the message instead of using pattern-matching
for this purpose. For instance, the action of retrieving the encrypted part of the message
m = se(x, K) is modelled by the equation x = sd(m, K). The executability of step i of
the protocol is guaranteed by the satisfiability of the system of equations. Futhermore, the
equational theory is enriched by the equations stating that a destructor f id is the inverse of
a constructor fc:
f id(fc(x1, . . . , xn)) = xi
In the case of the Dolev-Yao intruder, the addition of unification constraints [9] gives
exactly the same solutions as in the syntactic Dolev-Yao case. Indeed, it suffices to replace
the pattern-matching protocol step recv(se(x, K)).send(x) by the equational protocol step
recv(y).send(sd(y, K)) with the unification constraint y = sd(x, K). This equivalence
stems from the fact sd(sd(x, K), K) is equal, without any ambiguity and after rewriting, to
x. The assumption in the deterministic model presented in [9] is that any agent operation
can be specified with standard rewrite rules.
In web services application, this assumption is no longer valid since the specification
of operations on a message in XML syntax may be ambiguous. For instance, a typical
specification can be get the son of label a of the hedge x which is not uniquely determined
when the hedge x contain several nodes with the label a. This has been already already
identified as XML rewriting attacks (see [16] for a proposed counter-measure).
To model the previous operation by a destructor, say fa, we must have an equation
fa(a(x) · y′) = a(x), and apply fa on y. But, for a term y = a(x1) · a(x2), we have
both fa(y) = a(x1) and fa(y) = a(x2), hence a(x1) = a(x2): all terms heade by a are
undistinguishable. This is an overapproximation which precludes any reasonable analysis of
web services.
We believe that the simplest way to reduce this problem is the one adopted in this paper.
The fact that it keeps the intuitive destructor model of expliciting the operations performed
by all agents has an additional and not to be under-estimated advantage: the reader can
easily check that in the specific case where all deduction rules are of the shape Var(t) → t,
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it is possible to remove all intermediary steps (keeping when necessary the equations) in
a symbolic derivation and to replace them by “contexts” on top of the initial knowledge
and received variables. In other words, when deduction rules are of the shape Var(t) → t,
symbolic derivations can be trivially transformed into equivalent (w.r.t. the set of solutions)
deterministic constraint satisfaction problems of [9]. This means that the decidability results
known in this context can be transfered directly into the symbolic derivations framework.
Concluding remark. With respect to our current focus on Web Services, the setting
presented in this paper permits to import decision procedures already devised in either the
pattern-matching model or in the equational model. This permits e.g to have for free the
decidability of the deduction system that includes modular exponentiation, exclusive-or, and
e.g the syntactic Dolev-Yao intruder model. This means that in spite of the complexity of a
signature containing different encryption operations, some associative and some associative-
commutative symbols for hedges and a few free symbols to denote XML nodes, a first
decision procedure for the automated analysis of Web Services can be given by providing
just decision procedures for associative and AC symbols. The procedure for the former was
given in an earlier work [6], so we will just give here a decision for a deduction theory with
an AC symbol that denotes a multi-set.
5 Union of equational theories
From now on, we shall assume that F is the disjoint union of two signatures F1 and F2,
and we assume that E1 (resp. E2) is a consistent equational theory on F1 (resp. F2). We
denote by E the union of the theories E1 and E2. For instance F1 = {〈, 〉 , se(, )} and E1 = ∅,
F2 = {⊕, 0} and E2 = {x⊕ 0 = x, x⊕ x = 0, x⊕ y = y ⊕ x, x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z}.
5.1 Definitions for the union of two signatures
We recall that C is an infinite set of free constants, that X is an infinite set of variables and
that T(F1,X ) (resp. T(F2,X )) denotes the set of terms on F1 ∪ C (resp. F2 ∪ C). We
recall that the ordering < is a simplification ordering on T(F ,X ) total on T(F) such that
the constant cmin is the minimal element for <.
A term t in T(F1,X ) (resp. in T(F2,X )) is called a pure 1-term (resp. a pure 2-term).
We denote by Sign(·) the function that associates to each term t 6∈ C∪X the signature (F1
or F2) of its root symbol. For t ∈ C ∪ X we define Sign(t) = ⊥, with ⊥ a new symbol. The
term s is alien to u if Sign(s) 6= Sign(u). We now introduce a notion of subterm values of a
term t. Intuitively these subterm values are syntactic subterms of t that are either equal to
t or a strict maximal alien syntactic subterm of a subterm value of t. This notion permits
to simplify the reasoning on alien subterms of a term.
Definition 7 (factors) The set of factors of a term t is denoted Factors(t) and is the set
of maximal syntactic strict subterms of t that are either alien to t or atoms.
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Example 7 Consider F1 = {·, a, b, c} and F2 = {f} where f has arity 1. Then



Factors(f(f(a)) · (b · c)) = {f(f(a)), b, c}
Factors(f(f(f(b) · c))) = {f(b) · c}
Factors(a) = ∅
Note that if t itself is an atom, its set of factors is empty. We now define the notion of
subterm values.
Definition 8 (Subterms) Given a term t, the set of its subterm values is denoted by Sub(t)
and is defined recursively by Sub(t) = {t} ∪
⋃
u∈Factors(t) Sub(u).
By extension, for a set of terms E, the set Sub(E) is defined as the union of the subterms
values of the elements of E.
Example 8 Consider F1 and F2 as in Example 7. Then



Sub(f(f(a)) · (b · c)) = {f(f(a)) · (b · c), f(f(a)), a, b, c}
Sub(f(f(f(b) · c))) = {f(f(f(b) · c)), f(b) · c, f(b), b, c}
Sub(a) = {a}
This shows the difference with the notion of syntactic subterms.
In the rest of this paper and unless otherwise indicated, the notion of subterm will
refer to subterm values.
Applying unfailing completion to E = E1 ∪ E2, it is easy to notice [2] that the set of
generated equations R is the disjoint union of the two systems R1 and R2 also obtained by
applying unfailing completion procedures to E1 and to E2 respectively. (Since F1 ∩ F2 = ∅
and the Ei are assumed to be consistent i.e. the identity x =Ei y does not hold in either
theory, the critical pair generation will produce only pure equations.) We denote (t)↓ the
normal form of a term t for the rewrite system →R.
The abstraction of alien subterms, i.e. their replacement by constants, is used extensively
in the last part of the paper. We assume that we can associate to every term t ∈ T(F) a
new free constant ct
Definition 9 (Abstraction) For i = 1, 2, the function abi(t) is defined by:
• abi(f(t1, . . . , tn) = f(abi(t1), . . . , abi(tn)) if f ∈ Fi,
• abi(f(t1, . . . , tn) = cf(t1,...,tn) if f ∈ Fj, j 6= i,
• abi(c) = c if c ∈ C otherwise abi(c) = cmin
The abstraction Absi(t) of the term t is defined by abi((t)↓)
Let s, v be two terms, then the replacement δs,v is defined by tδs,v = t[Π← v] where Π is
the set of positions p such that s occurs at position p in t as a subterm value. By definition
δs denotes δs,cmin .
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5.2 Normalisation and replacements
This section gives several technical lemmas that prove that normalization of a term will not
introduce new factors except cmin (provided that the factors are already normalized). These
Lemmas are used to prove the properties of derivations given in Section 6.
Lemma 4 Let t ∈ T(F) be a ground term such that all factors of t are in normal form. Then
either (t)↓ ∈ Cspe∪Factors(t) or Sign(t) = Sign((t)↓) and Factors((t)↓) ⊆ Cspe ∪Factors(t).
Proof. Several cases may occur:
• If t is in normal form the result holds.
• If t is a constant, then t → t′ and Factors(t′) = {r1, . . . , rn} implies that t → t′′
is obtained from t′ by replacing each factor ri by cmin (the rewriting is still allowed
because ri > cmin for i = 1, . . . , n).
• If t is not in normal form, we prove that there is a ground term t′ such that t → t′
and either t′ ∈ Cspe∪Factors(t) or else (i) Factors(t′) ⊆ Factors(t)∪Cspe (ii)Sign(t) =
Sign(t′). If there exists such t′, then there is a sequence of rewriting steps t → t1 →
t2 . . . such that for all ti, either ti ∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(t) or else Factors(t′) ⊆ Cspe ∪
Factors(t). Since R is ground normalizing, the sequence is finite and the last term is
(t)↓, which proves the result.
Let t→ t′ be a rewrite step that uses the equation l = r and substitution σ such that
lσ > rσ. Let t = C[r1, . . . , rn] with r1, . . . , rn be the factors of t. Either t
′ ∈ Cspe or
t′ ∈ factort and we are done, or Sign(t′) = Sign(t). Since the factors are in normal
form, the rewriting is performed at a position p in C with a substitution σ. Since the
equation l = r is pure and in the same theory as C, we get that any factor of t and t′
occurs at a position below the position of a variable of r or l. Figure 5.2 shows how we
can replace an occurrence of a factor rnew occurring in t
′ but not in t by cmin to get
another rewrite step such that all occurrences of rnew introduced by yσ are replaced
by cmin. The ordering condition for rewriting still holds since cmin is the smallest term
and since the ordering is stable under context (u < v ⇒ C[u] < C[v]).

Lemma 5 Let t be a term such that its factors are in normal form, let s /∈ Cspe be a ground
term in normal form, let v be a ground term. If t →R t′ then s 6= t′ or Sign(s) 6= Sign(t)
implies tδs,v =R t
′δs,v.
Proof. The assumption t →R t′ implies that t is not in normal form and thus s 6= t.
Occurrences of u as a subterm in t are thus only at the level of factors or below it. Let π
be the position in t at which the equation l = r ∈ R is applied with a substitution τ . Let
τ ′ = τδs,v and let us prove that tδs,v =l=r t
′δs,v
By Lemma 1 the term l is not a variable. Thus we have the equality Sign(l) = Sign(t).
Since l is pure by construction of R the factors of lτ are factors of t and thus lτ ′ is a
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l
σ
yσ′ = yσδrnew,cmin for y not occurring in l
xσ′ = xσ for x occurring in l
rnew
>
cmin
r
yσ′
with equation l = r
with equation l = r
substitution σ
substitution σ′
since rnew > cmin
y doesn’t
yσ
occur in lr
Figure 1: Normalization doesn’t yield new factors
syntactic subterm of tδs,v . Thus it suffices to prove that the hypotheses on s and t imply
tδs,v[lτ
′ ← rτ ′] = t[lτ ← rτ ]δs,v .
If s 6= t′ the replacement on the right-hand side of the equation only occurs at the
position of factors of t′ or below. It thus occurs on factors of t or of τ and the equality holds.
If s = t′ then we have Sign(s) 6= Sign(t) by hypothesis and thus Sign(t′) 6= Sign(t). Since
s /∈ Cspe by hypothesis this implies that s ∈ Factors(t) by Lemma 4. We easily see that the
only possible case is that r ∈ Var(l), rτ = s and π = ε. In this case we have t′δs,v = v = rτ ′
and thus the Lemma is true. 
Lemma 6 Let t be a ground term and s /∈ Cspe be a term in normal form such that the
following condition Cond(t, s) is satisfied:
(i) If s = (t)↓ then Sign(s) 6= Sign(t) and
(ii) If s = (r)↓ for some r ∈ Sub(t) \ {t} such that r 6= s, then s is a free constant.
Let v be a ground term. If t is reducible then there exists t′ such that t→R t′, tδs,v =R t′δs,v,
and Cond(t′, s) holds if t′ is reducible.
Proof.
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• First, we prove that replacement and rewriting commute.
Since t is reducible, there exists t′ such that t → t′ by rewriting some subterm u ∈
Sub(t) into u′. Let us choose u minimal for the subterm ordering. This implies that
all factors of u are in normal form. Two cases occur:
– u = t. Either s 6= u′ or s = u′. Since s is in normal form, u = t→ u′ = s implies
s = (t)↓ and condition (i) of Cond(t, s) yields Sign(t) 6= Sign(s). Therefore either
s 6= t′ or Sign(t) 6= Sign(s), and Lemma 5 is applicable, yielding that tδs,v = t′δs,v .
– u 6= t. Since u is reducible, u 6= s and condition (ii) of Cond(t, s) yields that s
is a free constant. Then Sign(s) 6= Sign(u). Lemma 5 is applicable to u, yielding
that uδs,v =R u
′δs,v.
Let pu be the position of the subterm u in t (hence of the subterm u
′ in t′).
We prove that there is no subterm r′ ∈ Sub(t′) at a position q (strict) prefix
of pu such that r
′ = s. Otherwise, there exists a subterm r in t at position
p such that r → s. Since the rewriting occurs at position pu we must have
Sign(r) = Sign(r′) = Sign(s). The case r = t and p = ε is prevented by condition
(i) and the case r 6= t is prevented by condition (ii) since it implies that s is a
free constant (hence Sign(r) 6= Sign(s)).
Finally, if s occurs at position p in t′ with p not a prefix nor a suffix of pu, we
have a corresponding occurrence of s at the same position in t.
Therefore tδs,v = t
′δs,v.
• Then we prove now that Cond(t′, s) holds or that t′ is irreducible.
– We prove that s = (t′)↓ implies that Sign(t′) 6= Sign(s) (condition (i) of Cond(t′, s)).
If the rewriting step doesn’t occur at root position, then Sign(t) = Sign(t′).
Therefore Sign(t′) 6= Sign(s).
If the rewriting occurs at root position, then there exists a rewrite rule l → r
such that t = lσ and t′ = rσ. Then Sign(rσ) = Sign(lσ) unless r is a variable x,
and xσ is an alien subterm of lσ. Either s = xσ which is irreducible, or s 6= xσ.
In this latter case, since s = (t′)↓ = (xσ)↓, by condition (ii) of Cond(t, s), we get
that s is a free constant. Since xσ 6= s, the term xσ is reducible and Sign(xσ) 6=
Sign(s).
– We prove condition (ii) of Cond(t′, s). If r′ ∈ Sub(t′) is a subterm of t′ at
position p such that r′ 6= t and r′ is not in normal form, then there exists a
subterm r ∈ Sub(t) such that r → r′. Therefore s = (r′)↓ implies s = (r)↓ and s
is a free constant by condition (ii) of Cond(t, s).

Lemma 7 Let t be a term, σ be a normal ground substitution, and s /∈ Cspe be a term in
normal form such that the following conditions hold:
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1. s = (tσ)↓ implies Sign(s) 6= Sign(t) or t is a variable;
2. s = (t|pσ)↓ for some position p 6= ε of a non-variable subterm in t, then s is a free
constant and s 6∈ Sub(t);
3. s = xσ for some variable x at position p in t, then p is the position of a subterm in
tσ.
Then the equality (tσ)δs,v =R t(σδs,v)↓ holds for any ground term v.
Proof. Let t, s, and σ be two terms and a substitution satisfying the conditions of the
lemma. Let σ′ = (σδs,v)↓.
First, if t is a variable, notice that σ in normal form implies the resulting equation
becomes tσδs,v =R tσδs,v , which is trivial. Thus we can assume that t is not a variable and
thus that Sign(t) is defined.
Claim 1 For all non-variable subterm u of t one has uσ 6= s.
Proof of the claim. By contradiction assume there exists u ∈ Sub(t) \Var(t) such that
uσ = s. If u = t we have tσ = s. Since t is not a variable, this implies Sign(t) = Sign(s).
Furthermore, since s is in normal form, this implies that tσ is also in normal form, which
contradicts the first condition. Thus a candidate u such that uσ, and therefore (uσ)↓, is
equal to s is in Sub(t) \ (Var(t) ∪ {t}). The second condition implies that s must be a free
constant not occurring in t, which contradicts the fact that u is not a variable and uσ = s.
♦
Claim 2 (tσ)δs,v = t(σδs,v).
Proof of the claim. Let p be a position in t such that (tσ)|p = s. If p is the position
of a variable in t, then by the third condition p is the position of a subterm in tσ and s is
replaced by v at position p on both sides.
If p is not the position of a variable in t, then by the definition of the subterm relation it is a
subterm position in t iff it is a subterm position in tσ. Thus if s is replaced by v at position
p in tσ, there exists a non-variable subterm u of t such that uσ = s, which contradicts
Claim 1.
Thus all replacements on the left-hand side are applied at the level at or below a variable.
The equality follows. ♦
Let us now prove the Lemma. Applying a bottom-up normalisation of t(σδs,v) stopping
at the level of variables of t yields t(σδs,v) =R t(σδs,v)↓. By Claim 2 this implies (tσ)δs,v =R
t(σδs,v)↓, and we conclude the proof. 
Lemma 8 Let t be a term, σ be a normal ground substitution, and s /∈ Cspe be a term in
normal form such that the following conditions hold:
1. s = (tσ)↓ implies Sign(s) 6= Sign(t) or t is a variable;
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2. s = (t|pσ)↓ for some position p 6= ε of a non-variable subterm in t, then s is a free
constant and s 6∈ Sub(t);
3. s = xσ for some variable x at position p in t, then p is the position of a subterm in
tσ.
Then the equality ((tσ)↓δs,v)↓ = (t(σδs,v)↓)↓ holds for any ground term v.
Proof. If tσ is in normal form, then Lemma 7 and the convergence of R permit to conclude.
Otherwise, the conditions on t, s, and σ imply, with t′ = tσ, the ones of Lemma 6. This
permits to find a sequence ti of terms such that t0 = tσ, ti →R ti+1 and tiδs,v =R ti+1δs,v .
Since R is convergent, this sequence is finite. Let tn be the final term of a maximal sequence.
By maximality tn is in normal form, and thus equal to (tσ)↓. Applying Lemma 6 along
the normalisation sequence yields (tσ)δs,v =R (tσ)↓δs,v, and thus by Lemma 7 and the
convergence of R we have ((tσ)↓δs,v)↓ = (tσ′)↓. 
Lemma 9 Let t be a pure term, σ be a normal substitution, s /∈ Cspe be a term in nor-
mal form with Sign(s) 6= Sign(t). Then for any ground term v one has (t(σδs,v)↓)↓ =
((tσ)↓δs,v)↓.
Proof. Since t is pure and Sign(s) 6= Sign(t), if there exists a variable x at position p in
t such that xσ = s, then p is the position of a subterm in tσ. Since Sign(s) 6= Sign(t) we
have (trivially) that (tσ)↓ = s implies Sign(s) 6= Sign(t). Thus we can apply Lemma 8, thus
yielding the desired results.

Lemma 10 Let t be a term such that its factors are in normal form, and let u and v
be two ground terms in normal form with u /∈ {(t)↓} ∪ Cspe or Sign(u) 6= Sign(t). Then
(tδu,v)↓ = ((t)↓δu,v)↓.
Proof. It suffices to decompose t into a pure term t′ and a normal substitution σ and to
apply Lemma 9. 
Lemma 11 Let t be a term, let c /∈ Cspe, then for all term v,
((t)↓)δc,v =R tδc,v
Proof. Consider the term t′ constructed from t by replacing every occurrence of c by a
variable x and the substitution σ mapping x to c. The lemma is then a direct consequence
of Lemma 8. 
Let U be a set of terms. A ground term s is said to be bound by σ to the term t in U
if there exists t ∈ U such that (tσ)↓ = s. A ground term s which is not bound to any term
in U is said to be free in U . The following lemma permits us to define a new substitution
after the replacement of a free subterm of the solution σ.
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Lemma 12 Let t be a term and σ be a normalised substitution. Let s /∈ Cspe in Sub(tσ) be
such that s is free in Sub(t) for σ. Then ((tσ)↓δs,v)↓ = (t(σδs,v))↓.
Proof. Since s is free in Sub(t) for σ, there is no subterm u of t, including t and its
variables, such that (uσ)↓ = s. We can thus apply Lemma 8 to obtain the desired result.

The proof for next Lemma can be found in [10].
Lemma 13 For all normal substitutions σ, for all terms t and for all s ∈ Sub((tσ)↓) one
of the following holds:
• s ∈ Cspe;
• There is u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s);
• There exists x ∈ Var(t) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ).
6 Union of deduction systems
In this section, we revisit deductions rules and their properties when the signature is a
disjoint union.
6.1 Properties of derivations
Given a set of deduction rules R, we define 〈R〉 to be the minimal set of deduction rules
such that
(i) R ⊆ 〈R〉 and
(ii) for all d : t1, . . . , tn → t ∈ 〈R〉, d′ : t1, . . . , t′m → t
′ ∈ 〈R〉, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and for
all unifier σ of t and t′i modulo H, the deduction rule: (t1, . . . , tn, (t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m\t
′
i)→ t
′)σ
is in 〈R〉.
The rule constructed in (ii) is still a deduction rule since d, d′ are deduction rules. Hence
deduction rules in 〈R〉 are built by composing deduction rules in R iteratively. By induction
on the length of derivations, we can then prove that the deduction systems D = 〈F ,R,H〉
and D′ = 〈F , 〈R〉 ,H〉 define the same sets of derivable terms, i.e. for all E we have
DerI(E) = DerI′(E).
We consider now the union of two deduction systems D1 = 〈F1,R1, E1〉 and D2 =
〈F2,R2, E2〉, and we are interested in the derivations using →D1 ∪ →D2 .
Since 〈R1 ∪ R2〉 = 〈〈R1〉 ∪ 〈R2〉〉, the set of terms derivable with 〈R1 ∪ R2〉 is the same
set as the set of terms derivable with 〈R1〉 ∪ 〈R2〉. For technical reason, we use the latter
set to define the union of deduction systems.
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Definition 10 The union of the two deduction systems D1 = 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and D2 =
〈F2, S2, E2〉 is the deduction system D = 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉 and is denoted by
D1 ∪ D2.
From now we assume that deduction steps refer to the deduction system D =
D1 ∪ D2.
We extend the function Sign( ) to rules by setting Sign(d)=F i (i=1,2) if all terms in d are
pure F i-terms.
Lemma 14 Let l→ r be a rule in GI(d) with d : t1, . . . , tn → t and s /∈ Cspe alien to some
ti or t. Then (lδs)↓ → (rδs)↓ is also a rule in GI(d).
Proof. Let σ be a ground normal substitution such that (t1σ, . . . , tnσ)↓ = l and (tσ)↓ = r.
Let us prove that for u ∈ {t1, . . . , tn, t} one has ((uσ)↓δs)↓ = (u(σδs))↓. This suffices to find
a ground instance (lδs)↓ → (rδs)↓ in GI(d).
If u is a variable then σ in normal form implies (uσ)↓ = uσ and thus ((uσ)δs)↓ =
((uσ)↓δs)↓.
Otherwise, and since the rule is pure, the assumption implies that Sign(u) 6= Sign(s).
Since σ is a normal substitution, and since for u ∈ {t1, . . . , tn, t} the term u is pure, the
factors of uσ are in normal form.
These two previous facts and Lemma 10 imply that for all u ∈ {t1, . . . , tn, t} one has
((uσ)↓δs)↓ = ((uσ)δs)↓. Since s is alien to the term u we also have (uσ)δs = u(σδs). By
applying a bottom-up normalisation we have u(σδs) =E u(σδs)↓. Putting together these
equalities we obtain a substitution σ′ = (σδs)↓ such that the rule d instantiated by σ′ is
(lδs)↓ → (rδs)↓. 
The proof of the two next lemmas rely on the property of ordered rewriting shown in
Figure 2.
The next definition is needed to replace each different factor by a different free constant
without introducing occurrence of a free constants in a factor. Let r1, . . . , rn be a sequence
of terms, c1, . . . , cn be a sequence of constants that don’t occur in the ri’s, ci 6= cmin,
we define δ~r,~c as the composition δri1 ,ci1 . . . δrin ,cin where for each j, rij is maximal for
the subterm ordering in the sequence rij1 , . . . , rjn . The notation δ~c,~r defines the inverse
operation δcin ,rin . . . δri1 ,ci1 .
In figure 2, the rewriting step computing s from (sδ~r,~c)↓δ~c,~r exists since R is ground
normalizing. The fact that each factor of (sδ~r,~c)↓ is in {c1, . . . , cn} is a consequence of
Lemma 4.
Lemma 15 Let s1, . . . , sn → s ∈ GI(d) be a ground normalized instance of a deduction rule
d, and let Sign(s) 6= Sign(d). If s /∈ {s1, . . . , sn}∪Cspe, then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such
that Sign(si) = Sign(d) and s ∈ Factors(si).
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sδ~r,~c
because inclusion of sets of free constants
(sδ~r,~c)↓
s = (tσ)↓ = ((sδ~r,~c)↓δ~c,~r)↓
{cj1 , . . . , cjk
} ⊆ {c1, . . . , cp}
c = cjmr = rjm ⇐
r = rjm ∈ {r1, . . . , rp}
(sδ~r,~c)↓δ~c,~r=
Figure 2: Replacement of subterms by constants and normalization
Proof. Without loss of generality assume Sign(d) = 1. Let t1, . . . , tn → t be the rule
applied, and σ be the ground normal substitution with which it is applied. Let ~S be the
set of maximal subterms alien to d not in Cspe appearing in the rule, and ~CS be the set of
corresponding abstraction constants resulting from the application of Abs1( ) on the si and
s. Finally, let δ = δ~S, ~CS (as defined above) and δ
−1 = δ ~CS,~S . Let u ∈ {t1, . . . , tn, t}.
Since the abstraction constants are away from Const(σ), we have:
• ((uσ)↓δ)↓ = (u(σδ)↓)↓ by Lemma 12
• ((uσ)δ)↓ = ((uσ)↓δ)↓ by Lemma 7
• (((uσ)δ)δ−1)↓ = (((uσ)↓δ)↓δ−1)↓ by Lemma 11 and thus
(uσ)↓ = (((uσ)↓δ)↓δ−1)↓
Now by Lemma 1 we have:
Const((((uσ)↓δ)↓δ−1)↓) ∪ Cspe ⊆ Const(((uσ)↓δ)↓δ−1) ∪ Cspe
= Const(((uσ)↓δ)↓)δ−1 ∪ Cspe
⊆ Const((uσ)↓δ)δ−1 ∪ Cspe
= (Const((uσ)↓)δ)δ−1 ∪ Cspe
= Const((uσ)↓) ∪ Cspe
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and therefore
Const(((uσ)↓δ)↓δ−1) ∪ Cspe = Const((uσ)↓) ∪ Cspe
Thus:
Const(((uσ)↓δ)↓δ−1)δ ∪ Cspe = Const((uσ)↓)δ ∪ Cspe
→ (Const(((uσ)↓δ)↓)δ−1)δ ∪ Cspe = Const((uσ)↓)δ ∪ Cspe
→ Const(((uσ)↓δ)↓) ∪ Cspe = Const((uσ)↓δ) ∪ Cspe
Finally, and since we have:
• Const((t(σδ)↓)↓) ⊆ ∪ni=1Const((ti(σδ)↓)↓)∪Cspe by the constraint on ground instances
of deduction rules
• Since ((uσ)↓δ)↓ = (u(σδ)↓)↓ for u ∈ {t1, . . . , tn, t} this implies
Const(((tσ)↓δ)↓) ⊆ ∪ni=1Const(((tiσ)↓δ)↓) ∪ Cspe
• and thus Const((tσ)↓δ) ∪ Cspe ⊆ ∪ni=1Const((tiσ)↓δ) ∪ Cspe
By definition of δ this implies that the set of maximal subterms of (tσ)↓ alien to d is included
in the union of the sets of maximal subterms of the (tiσ)↓ alien to d.
If s is itself alien to d, we can assume that s is not on the left-hand side of the rule
instance, for otherwise the rule is necessarily a stutter. Thus there exists a ti such that
s is a maximal alien subterm of (tiσ)↓ and s 6= (tiσ)↓. Thus s is a factor of (tiσ)↓ and
Sign((tiσ)↓) = Sign(d). 
Lemma 16 Let s1, . . . , sn → s ∈ GI(d) be a ground normalized instance of an deduction
rule and let Sign(s) = Sign(d). Then for all r ∈ Factors(s) either r ∈ {s1, . . . , sn} ∪Cspe or
there exists i such that Sign(si) = Sign(d) and r ∈ Factors(si).
Proof. The proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 15 but for the concluding
step, which is left to the reader. 
6.2 Properties of one-step deductions
First we prove some properties that are local to a given deduction in a derivation. To begin
with, we prove that, informally, if the set of subterms changes after a deduction of a term s
by a rule in GI(d), then the only change is the addition of s with Sign(d) = Sign(s).
Lemma 17 Let E and F be two finite sets of normalized terms and let E →GI(d) F be a
deduction and assume that Sub(E)∪Cspe 6= Sub(F )∪Cspe. Then F = E, s, with Sub(F ) =
Sub(E) ∪ {s} and Sign(d) = Sign(s).
Proof. Let s be the term deduced by the deduction rule. By contradiction let us first
assume that Sign(s) 6= Sign(d). By Lemma 15 this implies that s ∈ Sub(E). Since Sub(F ) =
Sub(E) ∪ Sub(s) this contradicts Sub(E) 6= Sub(F ), and thus Sign(s) = Sign(d).
In this case, by Lemma 16, all factors of s are in Sub(E) ∪ Cspe. Thus by definition of
the subterm relation, we have (Sub(F ) ∪ Cspe) \ (Sub(E) ∪ Cspe) = s. 
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The properties of 〈R〉 allow to state the following lemma:
Lemma 18 Let D be a derivation and l → r ∈ GI(d) a rule applied in D. Then for each
s ∈ l if there is a rule ls → s ∈ GI(d′) applied in D then we can assume d and d′ are rules
of different deduction systems D1 or D2.
Proof. By contradiction. Let D be the set of derivations for which the lemma does not
hold and let D be in D with a minimal number of rules application that does not satisfy the
lemma. Let l → r ∈ GI(d) be the first of these rules. For any term s ∈ l such that there
exists a rule ls → s ∈ GI(d′) in D we do the following construction:
Since d and d′ are in the same deduction system wlog we can assume d, d′ ∈ 〈R1〉, and
since the result of the ground instance d′ is used in the left-hand side of the ground instance
of d, there exists a unifier between the result of d′ and a term in the left-hand side of d.
Thus by construction 〈R1〉 contains a rule that has a ground instance:
ls, (l \ s)→ r
By iterating this construction on l we build a rule matching the criterion. This contradicts
the minimality of D in D. Thus D is empty. 
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 17 that will be used throughout
this paper.
Lemma 19 Let D : E0 → . . . → En be a derivation where the Ei are normalized for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and assume there exists s ∈ Sub(Ei) \ (Sub(E0) ∪Cspe). Then there exists in
D a step Ej−1 →ls→s Ej with j ≤ i and ls → s ∈ GI(d) with Sign(d) = Sign(s).
Proof. Consider the minimal indice j such that s ∈ Sub(Ej). By hypothesis we have j > 0
and j ≤ i. Moreover by minimality of j we have Sub(Ej) 6= Sub(Ej−1). Since s /∈ Cspe
Lemma 17 implies that Ej = Ej−1, s, and that if Ej−1 →ls→s= Ej with ls → s ∈ GI(d)
then Sign(d) = Sign(s). 
6.3 Well-formed derivations
A derivation E0 →I E1 = E0, t1 →D · · · →I En = En−1, tn of deduction system D is
well-formed if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ti ∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe. In other words every
message generated by an intermediate step either occurs in the goal, in the initial set of
messages or is a special constant.
In the next lemma we assume that E and t are in normal form, that cmin ∈ E and that
all terms produced during a derivation are in normal form.
Lemma 20 A derivation of minimal length starting from E of goal t is well-formed.
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Proof. By contradiction. Let n be the length of D, and let {t1, . . . , tn} be such that t = tn
and
D : E → E, t1 → E, t1, t2 → . . .→ E, t1, . . . , tn
Since D is minimal, it is without stutter. Let us assume that the property doesn’t hold, and
let i be the maximal indice such that ti 6∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪Cspe. This implies ti 6= tn and thus
i < n. Since the derivation is without stutter, Lemma 19 yieds that ti /∈ Sub(E0) ∪ Cspe
implies ti /∈ Sub(Ei−1) ∪ Cspe. Let Li → ti ∈ GI(d) such that Ei−1 → Li→tiEi. By
Lemma 17 this implies Sign(d) = Sign(ti).
By minimality of D, the term ti must be used in the left-hand side of a subsequent step
in the derivation (otherwise the step producing ti can be avoided). Let Ω be the set of step
indices i where ti has to be used in left-hand side. More precisely, let
Ω = {h |Eh−1 → Eh ∈ D and Eh−1 \ {ti} 6→ Eh \ {ti}}
Ω is non-empty from our previous assumption. Let j be the minimum element of Ω and
let lj → tj ∈ GI(d
′) be the j-th deduction rule in derivation D. Note that j > i and
thus by maximality of i we have tj ∈ Sub(E0, tn). Therefore ti /∈ Sub(tj). Moreover
j ∈ Ω implies ti ∈ lj . By Lemma 18 we can assume d and d′ are not in the same theory.
Since Sign(d) = Sign(ti) we have Sign(ti) 6= Sign(d′). Thus by Lemma 14 there exists a rule
(ljδti)↓ → (tjδti)↓ in GI(d’). By minimality of j the only term r ∈ Ej−1 such that ti ∈ Sub(r)
is ti itself and thus (ljδti)↓ = lj , cmin \ {ti}. Since ti /∈ Sub(tj) we have (tjδti)↓ = tj . Thus
there exists in GI(d’) a rule l′j → tj with l
′
j ⊆ Ej−1 and ti /∈ Ej . This contradicts again
j ∈ Ω, therefore Ω is empty which shows that our initial assumption cannot hold. 
7 Decidability results
The main result of this paper is a modularity result that can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 If the ordered satisfiability problem for closed symbolic derivation is decidable
for two deduction systems 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 with disjoint signatures F1 and F2
then the ordered satisfiability problem for closed symbolic derivation is decidable for the
deduction system 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
This result is obtained as a consequence of Algorithm 1 reducing the resolution of a D-
symbolic derivation C to the resolution of D1 and D2 symbolic derivations with the addition
of ordering constraints among the variables of C to the already present ordering constraints
between variables and constants of C. The proof of the soundness and completeness of this
algorithm relies on the results given in Section 9.
In [9] we have defined the deterministic symbolic derivations that model the execution of
protocols in which a message sent by an honest agent is uniquely determined (up to nonce’s
values) by the messages received so far. Here we rather introduce symbolic derivations to
model protocol instances in which roles are defined by the sequence of deductions applied on
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the received messages to build the responses. The difference with the deterministic systems
is that now we introduce new variables that keep track of the deductions performed by
honest agents when they compose messages at each step.
8 Bound solutions of symbolic derivations
We recall that the deduction system D is the union of the two deduction systems 〈F1, S1, E1〉
and 〈F2, S2, E2〉. In the rest of this section we first prove in Subsection 8.1 that if s is a
free subterm of σ then replacing it by cmin in derivations yields new derivations (i.e. no
deduction power is lost.) Then we prove in that if C is satisfiable there exists a solution σ
of C which is constructed from the subterms of the input problem (Subsection 8.2).
8.1 Stability of derivations by replacement of free subterms
First we prove that when replacing a free term s in σ by the constant cmin we still obtain a
derivation.
The next lemma is a one-step version of Lemma 22.
Lemma 21 Let G be a finite set of normalised terms with cmin ∈ G, let r and s be two
normalised terms with s /∈ Cspe, let lr be the rule r1, . . . , rn → r ∈ GI(u), ls be the rule
s1, . . . , sm → s ∈ GI(v) . Assume moreover Sign(v) = Sign(s) and:
G→ls G, s→lr G, r, s
Then either (rδs)↓ ∈ (Gδs)↓ or:
(Gδs)↓ →I (Gδs)↓, s, (rδs)↓
Proof. Assume (rδs)↓ /∈ (Gδs)↓ and thus s 6= r. By Lemma 18 we can safely assume
Sign(u) 6= Sign(v). Thus the assumption Sign(s) = Sign(u) implies Sign(s) 6= Sign(v). The
result is then a trivial consequence of Lemma 14. 
Lemma 22 will be applied with s a free term in a solution σ in Lemma 24. It permits us
to characterise minimal solutions of a constraint satisfaction problem.
Lemma 22 Let E and F be finite sets of normalised terms with cmin ∈ E. Let s, t be two
normalised terms not in Cspe with s ∈ Der(E) \ Sub(E) and t ∈ Der(E ∪ F ). We have:
(tδs)↓ ∈ Der(((E ∪ F )δs)↓)
Proof. By assumption there exists:
• a derivation Dt : E ∪ F →
∗ GE∪F → GE∪F , t with t /∈ GE∪F ;
• a derivation Ds : E →
∗ GE → GE , s with s /∈ GE
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and therefore one can construct the derivation:
D : E ∪ F →∗ F ∪GE → F ∪GE , s→
∗ GE , GE∪F , s→ GE , GE∪F , s, t
where the instantiated deduction rules applied up to the deduction of s are from Ds and
those applied thereafter are from Dt. Let t1, . . . , tn be the sequence of the terms deduced
along the derivation D, and is be minimal such that tis = s, and G0, . . . , Gn be the sequence
of knowledge sets.
By contradiction, assume the lemma does not hold, and thus (tnδs)↓ /∈ Der(((E ∪ F )δs)↓).
This implies that the set of indices i such that (tiδs)↓ /∈ Der(((E ∪ F )δs)↓) is not empty.
Let i0 be minimal in this set. Since s /∈ GE and s /∈ Sub(E), Lemma 19 implies that
s /∈ Sub(GE). This has two consequences:
• the rule applied to deduce s in D is from the same signature as s;
• we have i0 ≥ is, and since cmin ∈ E we have i0 > is.
From this we conclude that s ∈ Gi0−1, and that there exists a sequence of two deductions:
Gi0−1 \ {s} →l1 Gi0−1 →l2 Gi0−1, ti0
where l1 (resp. l2) is the rule applied in D to deduce s (resp. ti0). By Lemma 21 this
implies that either (ti0δs)↓ ∈ (Gi0−1δs)↓ or that there exists a deduction (Gi0−1δs)↓ →
(Gi0−1δs)↓, (ti0δs)↓. Both cases contradict the fact that (ti0δs)↓ /∈ Der(((E ∪ F )δs)↓), which
proves the lemma.

8.2 Existence and properties of bound solutions
Let C be a symbolic derivation and KD be the initial knowledge of an intruder trying to
mount an attack against C. From now we say a ground term is bound if it is bound by σ
in Sub(C ∪KD), unless otherwise specified. In the same way a term is free if it is free in
Sub(C ∪KD). We say a substitution σ is bound if for all variables x in its support all terms
in Sub(xσ) are bound by σ in Sub(C ∪KD).
The proof of the following lemma relies on the hypothesis above that σ is normal.
Lemma 23 Let Cc = (V ,S,K) be a closed derivation with V = (x1, . . . , xm), and sigma
be a ground normal substitution that satisfies Cc. Let s /∈ Cspe be a term such that s ∈
Sub((xkσ)↓) for some k ∈ Ind. Then there exists
• an equation xj
?
= t in S with t ground and s ∈ Sub(t) or
• j ≤ Indk such that (xjσ)↓ = s and xj is the right-hand side of a rule d with Sign(d) =
Sign(s).
INRIA
Toward an Automatic Analysis of Web Service Security 31
Proof. Let k be minimal in Ind such that s ∈ Sub((xkσ)↓). If the first term of the
alternative does not hold, and since there is no input variable, by definition of symbolic
derivation we have that xk is the right-hand side of a deduction rule applied on xβ1 , . . . , xβl
with βj <Ind i for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, and s ∈ Sub(xkσ). Let E = xβ1σ, . . . , xβlσ. We have
s /∈ Sub(E)∪Cspe and E → E, xjσ with s ∈ Sub(xjσ) \Cspe. We conclude with Lemma 19.

We now prove that if C is satisfiable then it is satisfied by a bound substitution. First
we prove it is possible to replace one free term s by the minimal constant.
Lemma 24 If there exists CD(KD) and σ such that σ |= C ◦ CD(KD) and x ∈ Var(C),
s ∈ Sub(xσ) such that s is free in Sub(C ∪ KD) for σ, then there exists C ′D(KD) such that
(σδs)↓ |= C ◦ C′D(KD)
Proof. Let C, KD and σ be such that there exists a symbolic derivation CD(KD) with
σ |= C ◦ CD(KD) and s ∈ Sub(σ) is free. Let C = (V ,S,K, In,Out), and Cc = C ◦ CD(KD),
and σ′ = (σδs)↓, and:
{
I = (vi)i∈In
Oi = {vj | j ∈ Out and j < i}
Let us first note that σ |= S and s free in Sub(S) imply by Lemma 12 that σ′ |= S.
Thus to prove the existence of C ′D(KD) such that σ
′ |= C ◦ C′D(KD) it suffices to prove that
for all i ∈ In we have viσ′ ∈ Der(KD ∪ Oiσ′). Since Cc is a closed symbolic derivation
and s /∈ Sub(C ∪ KD) by Lemma 23 there exists a variable vs of Cc such that vsσ = s
and for all variables x of Cc of rank lower than vs we have s /∈ Sub(xσ). Since s is free
in Sub(C) this variable corresponds to an intruder deduction. Id est, there exists is such
that s /∈ Sub(Oisσ ∪ KD) and s ∈ Der(Oisσ ∪ KD). For i ≥ is, applying Lemma 22 with
E = Oisσ ∪ KD, and F = Oiσ ∪ KD, and t = viσ yields viσ
′ ∈ Der(Oiσ′ ∪ KD). For i < is
the result is trivial since in this case viσ
′ = viσ and Oiσ
′ = Oiσ by minimality of is. Thus
there exists a symbolic derivation C ′D(KD) such that σ
′ |= C ◦ C′D(KD).

The proof of next Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 24 and exploits the
well-foundedness of the order < to prove it is possible to iteratively replace all free subterms.
Proposition 1 Let C be a satisfiable symbolic derivation. There exists a normal bound
substitution σ such that σ |= C.
Proof. Consider the set Σ of normal substitutions that satisfy C. By hypothesis Σ is not
empty. Let σ be a minimal substitution in Σ for the total ordering < on ground terms
extended on substitutions seen as multisets of ground terms. Let us prove σ is bound to C.
By contradiction assume there exists s free in Sub(σ) and let σ′ = (σδs)↓. By Lemma 24
we also have σ′ |= C. By monotony of <, cmin < s implies σ′ < σ. By definition of R we
have (σ′)↓ ≤ σ′. Thus (σ′)↓ ∈ Σ and (σ′)↓ < σ which contradicts the minimality of σ. 
RR n° 6341
32 Chevalier, Lugiez & Rusinowitch
Lemma 25 If σ is a bound substitution such that there exists a symbolic derivation CD(KD)
with σ |= C ◦ CD(KD) then there exists CD(KD) such that:
• Sub((Sub(C ∪ KD)σ)↓) = (Sub(C ∪ KD)σ)↓;
• For all derivation variable x of CD(KD) one has xσ ∈ Sub((Cσ ∪ KD)↓).
Proof. Let us prove the first point. Let S = (Sub(C ∪ KD)σ)↓. We have S ⊆ Sub(S). The
converse inclusion Sub(S) ⊆ S follows directly from:
Sub((Sub(C ∪ KD)σ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(C ∪ KD)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(Var(C ∪ KD)σ) ∪ Cspe
Since σ is bound we have Sub(Var(C ∪ KD)σ) ⊆ (Sub(C ∪ KD)σ)↓ and by hypothesis we
have Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). The second point is a direct consequence of the first point and of the
existence of well-formed derivations (i.e. Lemma 20). 
Before presenting the combination algorithm for Theorem 1 let us terminate with lemmas
stating how a closed symbolic derivation can be split into symbolic derivations on two
disjoint signatures, and how intruder deduction rules may be eliminated and replaced by
output/input variables.
The abstraction Absi(σ) of a substitution σ in Fi is the substitution such that for all
x in the support of σ, xAbsi(σ) is the abstraction of xσ in Fi. In the statement of next
lemma, Sign(t) designates the signature to which belongs the top symbol of the term t.
From a system of equations S, one notes that by introducing new variables one can derive
an equisatisfiable homogeneous set of equations S1 ∪ S2 such that terms in Si are pure
Fi-terms for i = 1, 2.
The proof idea of Lemma 26 is to “abstract” a solution σ for a symbolic derivation C
in deduction system 〈F1 ∪ F2, S1 ∪ S2, E1 ∪ E2〉 and to apply iteratively Lemma 14 in order
to show for i = 1, 2 that Absi(σ) is a solution of the symbolic derivation in the deduction
system 〈Fi, Si, Ei〉.
Lemma 26 Let C = (V ,S,K) be a closed derivation satisfied by a normal substitution σ for
the deduction system 〈F1 ∪ F2, S1 ∪ S2, E1 ∪ E2〉. For i = 1, 2 let Si denote the purification
of S and:
Ki ={Absi(t) ∈ Sub(K) | Sign(t) = i and ∃x ∈ V , xσ = t} ∪ {x ∈ V | Sign(xσ) 6= i}
Then two closed symbolic derivations Ci = (V ,Si,Ki) (for i = 1, 2) can be computed such
that they are satisfied by Absi(σ) for intruder 〈Fi, Si, Ei〉 respectively.
Proof. By symmetry it suffices to prove that (V ,S1,K1) is a closed symbolic derivation.
Let x be a variable in V and i be the rank of x. Since C is closed, by Lemma 23 we have:
• there is an equation x
?
= t in S with t ground, or
• x is the result of a rule d with Sign(d) = type(w).
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If Sign(d) = F1 then all equations corresponding to this rule are pure F1 equations and thus
are present in S1. On the other hand, if Sign(d) = F2 then we also have Sign(xσ) = F2 and
thus x is abstracted by a constant, and therefore as a ground term.
Finally the fact that Ci is satisfied by the abstraction on signature Fi of σ (for i ∈ {1, 2})
is a consequence of repeated applications of Lemma 14 to replace maximal alien subterms
(factors or the term itself) of the xσ, for x ∈ V by the corresponding abstraction constants.

Lemma 27 Let KD be a finite set of ground terms and C = (V ,S,K, In,Out) be a symbolic
derivation such that there exists σ and CD(KD) with σ |= C ◦CD(KD). Let Sd ⊆ S be a set of
equations corresponding to the application of rule d with lhs indices I ⊆ Ind and rhs indice
i ∈ Ind. Then:
C′ = (V ,S \ Sd,K, In ∪ {i},Out ∪ I)
is a symbolic derivation such that there exists C ′D(KD) with σ |= C ◦ C
′
D(KD).
Proof. Add Sd to CD(KD) together with additional variables matching the In and Out
changes. 
9 Deriving pure symbolic derivations
In Algorithm 1, a partial symbolic derivation designates a symbolic derivation for which
variables in V whose index is not in In may have no associated equation in S (may not be
a left-hand side of an equation in S).
Theorem 2 (Completeness) If C is satisfiable then Algorithm 1 returns Sat.
Proof. Assume C is satisfiable. By Proposition 1 there exists a normal substitution σ
bound by σ in Sub(C) ∪ KD and a symbolic intruder derivation CD(KD) such that σ |=
C ◦ CD(KD). By Lemma 25 we can assume that for all derivation variable x of CD(KD) one
has xσ ∈ Sub((Cσ ∪ KD)↓).
Let CD(KD) = (VD,SD,KD, InD,OutD). Since the composed symbolic derivation is
closed, we have |InD| = |Out| and |OutD| = |In|. Re-using already deduced terms, one
easily sees that the number of different variables of VD corresponding to intruder deduction
rules is bounded by |(Cσ ∪ KD)↓| and thus by |Sub(C ∪ KD)|. The number of positions in VD
equal to a ground term is bounded by KD, the number of input positions is |Out|. Finally
we allow for |In| other positions to enable the intruder to send several times the same term.
Thus we can assume
|Ind| ≤ |Sub(C) + |In|+ |Out|+ |KD|
The substitution σ defines an equivalence relation ≡σ on Sub(C ∪ KD) by setting t ≡σ s iff
(tσ)↓ = (sσ)↓. Let X be a set of new variables representing the equivalence classes of ≡σ.
We also designates σ the extension of σ to X . Let SD be the set of all purified equations
t
?
= x for t ∈ Sub(C ∪ KD), where x is the representant of the equivalence class of t. The
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Algorithm 1 Combination Algorithm
SolveD(C,≺)
Input: C = (V ,S,K, In,Out) where S homogeneous;
A finite set of ground terms KD;
A linear ordering ≺ on Var(C) ∪ Const(C).
1: Choose a partial symbolic derivation CD = (VD,SD,KD, InD,OutD) such that:
• |VD| ≤ |Sub(C)|+ |In|+ |Out|+ |KD|
• |InD| = |Out| and |OutD| = |In|
• The composition C ◦ CD(KD) is defined
• SD is homogeneous, contains equations x
?
= t with t ∈ Sub(C) ∪ VD and x ∈ X , a
set of new variables with |X | ≤ |Sub(C)∪ VD|, and defines an equivalence relation
≡SD on Sub(C) ∪ VD
2: Choose a linear ordering ≺X on variables in X ∪ Const(C) ∪ Var(C) extending ≺. Let
X1 and X2 be two disjoint subsets of X
3: Form the closed partial symbolic derivation C ′ = C ◦ CD, and purify it into two pure
symbolic derivations C1 and C2, where variables of X1 (resp. X2) are considered as
constants in C2 (resp. C1).
4: If SolveD1(C1,≺X) and SolveD2(C2,≺X) return Sat else fail
newly introduced variables are employed to purify the equations t
?
= x with t ∈ Sub(KD)
which are the only non-pure ones. By definition of SD one easily sees that the symbolic
derivation Cσ = (VD,SD ∪ SD,KD, InD,OutD) can also be composed with C to obtain a
closed symbolic derivation satisfied by σ.
Let us choose in the first step of the algorithm the partial symbolic derivation leaving
SD aside, i.e.:
CD = (VD,SD,KD, InD,OutD)
We let ≺X be any linear ordering compatible with ≺ and the subterm relation on Xσ. We
let X1 (resp. X2) be the subset of X of variables x with Sign(xσ) = F1 (resp. F2).
We note that C ◦ Cσ is a closed symbolic derivation. Thus, by Lemma 26 the sym-
bolic derivations C1,σ and C2,σ are also closed symbolic derivations satisfied respectively by
Abs1(σ) and Abs2(σ). To complete the proof it then suffices to notice that iterated ap-
plications of Lemma 27 on C1,σ (resp. C2,σ) yield the symbolic derivation C1 (resp. C2)
guessed by the algorithm which thus is also satisfiable. The ordering ≺X is satisfied by σ
by construction. 
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To prove the correction, it suffices to note that the linear ordering ≺X permits to con-
struct a solution σ from two partial solutions σ1 and σ2, and that one obtains deduction
rules when replacing free constants by alien terms in normal form.
10 Application to Security Protocols
We refer to [6] for the definition of an intruder on words as well as for the proof of the
decidability of its related ordered satisfiability problem. We will present here a similar
result for an intruder on multi-sets of terms. We believe that the proof can be carried as is
to prove the decidability of ordered satisfiabiliy problems for a deduction system operating
on sets, when one allows for the set union and the extraction of a subset.
10.1 Multisets
We consider the signature F = {+, 1} with the following equational theory:
E



x + y = y + x
x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z
x + 1 = x
This is the associative-commutative theory with unit, usually denoted ACU. Notice however
that the presence or absence of the last axiom does not affect our decidability result. We
consider the deduction rules:
R



x + y → x
x, y → x + y
→ 1
Let D = 〈F ,R, E〉. First let us notice that these are indeed deduction rules since the theory
is regular and the variables on the right-hand side of deduction rules also appear on the
left-hand side. Let us prove a few results on the deduction with D.
Proposition 2 Let E and t be respectively a set of terms and a term in normal form modulo
E. We have:
• Const(E) ⊆ DerD(E) and E ⊆ DerD(Const(E));
• DerD(E) = DerD(Const(E));
• t ∈ DerD(E) iff Const(t) ⊆ Const(E)
Proof. Let us prove the points sequentially. Let c ∈ Const(E) be a constant, and e ∈ E
be a term such that c ∈ Const(e). We have therefore e = e′ + c. Thus in one step we have
E → E, c. Since c is arbitrary, we have Const(E) ⊆ DerD(E). We easily sees that we also
have E ∈ DerD(Const(E)).
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From this the second point follows by double inclusion. For the last point we have
t ∈ DerD(E) is equivalent to DerD(E) = DerD(E, t), and thus by the second point it is
equivalent to DerD(Const(E)) = DerD(Const(E, t)). By contradiction assume there exists
c ∈ Const(t) \ Const(E). Given the constraint on constants in deduction rules we have c /∈
DerD(Const(E)) whereas c trivially is in DerD(Const(E, t)), which contradicts the equality,
and thus t ∈ DerD(E) 
The consequence of Proposition 2 is that, as far as sequences of deductions are concerned,
only the set of constants appearing or not in the initial knowledge and the goal of a putative
derivation are relevant to assess its feasibility. This has the important implication, with
respect to decidability, that it is not necessary to know the exact instance of intruder’s
knowledge (its initial knowledge and the messages in the output of the symbolic derivation
up to this point) and of the goal (the next input message of the symbolic derivation) to
decide whether a derivation exists. It suffices to know the (guessable) sets of constants of
the knowledge and of the goal. Finally, let us notice that unifiability modulo AC or ACU
with ordering constraints can be decided by setting, for a variable x in which constants
a1, . . . , ak must appear and constants b1, . . . , bl may not appear by replacing in all equations
x by x′ +a1 + . . .+ak and by setting the ordering constraints x ≺ b1, . . . , bl. These remarks
permit to prove the correcteness of Algorithm 2.
10.2 Algorithm for ordered satisfiability
The completeness of this algorithm is trivial. The correcteness is a result of Proposition 2.
Note on the complexity. The first step can be done in NPTIME. The satisfiability of
linear equation systems over positive integers is in NPTIME. The check in the third step
can be performed in PTIME. Thus the ordered satisfiability for multi-set deduction systems
is in NPTIME. We finally have:
Theorem 3 Ordered satisfiability of multiset deduction systems is decidable in NPTIME.
11 Conclusion
Web service XML messages are often vulnerable to rewriting attacks since the associated
message format and processing model are quite tolerant to inclusion of new elements. We
have developed a verification procedure that accounts for this and moreover can be extended
with most existing protocol analysis procedures for algebraic operators. The combination
algorithm applies in particular to encryption/decryption operators [17], list with associative
concatenation [7], XOR [8], abelian groups [15]. Our framework allows to describe specific
implementation of XML/XPath library and we aim at extending this work to take the
various security standards for Web services. We also plan to implement it in the AVISPA
platform [1].
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Algorithm 2 Resolution of ordered statisfiability problems for multi-set deduction systems
SolveD(C,≺)
Input:
• C = (V ,S,K, In,Out);
• A finite set of ground terms KD;
• An ordering constraint ≺ between Var(C) and Const(C).
1: For each variable x in V choose the set of constants Px = {a1, . . . , ak} that will be present
in the guessed solution. All these constants must be lower than x for the ordering ≺
2: Check the satisfiability of the unification system S by transforming it in a set of linear
equations over N by setting, for each variable v ∈ V :
v = Σc∈Pv (λv,c + 1)c
3: Check for each variable v ∈ In that
Pv ⊆ Const(KD) ∪
⋃
v′ ∈ Out
v′ <V v
Pv′
4: If both checks are successful return Sat else fail
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